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THE MYTH OF THE “FULL RIDE”: CHEATING OUR 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETES AND THE NEED FOR 
ADDITIONAL NCAA SCHOLARSHIP-LIMIT REFORM 
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, JR.* & DYLAN OLIVER MALAGRINÒ** 
Abstract 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association should amend Bylaw 15.1 
and allow institutions to award athletic scholarship monies up to the 
institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance. NCAA Bylaw 15.1 limits 
an individual student-athlete’s athletic scholarships and other financial aid 
based on athletic ability to the value of a full grant-in-aid. The individual 
student-athlete scholarship limit is an arbitrary price cap and an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
because it prevents student-athletes from receiving financial aid up to the 
institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance, which includes the 
additional expenses an institution deems necessary to meet the cost of 
living at the school. Setting the permissible athletic scholarship limit at the 
institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance is a less restrictive 
alternative that still protects the pro-competitive virtues the NCAA has 
frequently proffered in support of its price cap. The NCAA has settled 
previous antitrust complaints brought by student-athletes alleging that 
athletic scholarship limits were unreasonable restraints of trade. And 
recently, the NCAA recognized that settlement was not enough to fulfill the 
NCAA’s educational mission and preserve the rights of student-athletes in 
Division I programs. But instead of retiring the deficient limit, the NCAA 
designated a new, arbitrary cap. However, the NCAA suspended 
implementation of this change so the Division I Board of Directors could 
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reconsider the amendment. In reconsidering the amendment, and in light of 
the recent settlement in the White v. NCAA lawsuit, the NCAA should fully 
liberalize Bylaw 15.1 and allow institutions to award athletic scholarship 
monies up to the institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance. This is the 
only way to ensure that all future Division I student-athletes will not be 
financially disadvantaged even with the hard work these athletes perform 
for their institutions’ athletic programs; further, anything less is an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
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Introduction 
The National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) Division I 
membership should liberalize Bylaw 15.11 because the regulation is an 
unlawful restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act2 and because the 
NCAA’s guiding principles call for institutions to have the option of 
providing to their student-athletes comprehensive scholarship packages that 
will best lead toward degree completion.3 According to the NCAA’s 
mission statement, the NCAA exists “to govern competition in a fair, safe, 
equitable and sportsmanlike manner and to integrate intercollegiate athletics 
into higher education so that the educational experience of the student-
athlete is paramount.”4 
However, if the student-athlete’s educational experience is of paramount 
importance to the NCAA, then the NCAA Division I member institutions 
should not prevent student-athletes from receiving the scholarship monies 
that students need for the additional cost of living expenses attributed to 
attending college.5 The offer for a “full ride” promised to a prospective 
                                                                                                                 
 1. NCAA, 2012–13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.1, at 202 [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf. 
Bylaw § 15.1 provides the maximum limit on financial aid for an individual: 
A student-athlete shall not be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics if 
he or she receives financial aid that exceeds the value of the cost of attendance 
as defined in Bylaw 15.02.2. A student-athlete may receive institutional 
financial aid based on athletics ability (per Bylaw 15.02.4.1) and educational 
expenses awarded per Bylaw 15.2.6.4 up to the value of a full grant-in-aid, plus 
any other financial aid up to the cost of attendance. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 3. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 2.01, 2.13, at 3, 5; see also id. § 15.01.1, at 
199. The NCAA’s purpose is to promote education and maintain amateurism. Id. §§ 2.5, 2.9, 
at 4. 
 4. Eye on the Money, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/ 
Answers/Eye+on+the+Money (last visited May 27, 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.13, at 5. 
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collegiate student-athlete during the college recruitment process is nothing 
more than a ploy to hide the actual financial risk of attending college and to 
lure high school students to play Division I athletics at that school.6 While 
attending college, students have many costs to consider, including housing, 
utilities, food, transportation, insurance, books, and school supplies.7 And, 
although one can identify many of these expenses in advance of 
matriculation, a college student also needs to consider the costs of 
incidental personal items and miscellaneous expenses for living in the 
particular city or town where the institution is located.8 When recruiting 
prospective student-athletes to play for an institution, a school ought to be 
able to offer a comprehensive package to these prospects because the 
school’s central administration financial aid office has already calculated 
the necessary cost of living expenses associated with attending the 
particular school.9 The “full ride” scholarship offer should include those 
costs. 
Therefore, the NCAA should amend Bylaw 15.1 and allow institutions to 
award athletic scholarship monies up to the institutionally set, estimated 
cost of attendance.10 NCAA Bylaw 15.1 limits an individual student-
athlete’s athletic scholarships and other financial aid based on athletic 
ability to the value of a full grant-in-aid.11 And, recognizing the need for a 
change to this limitation, on October 27, 2011, the NCAA Division I Board 
of Directors amended Bylaw 15.1, permitting institutions to award 
scholarship monies to student-athletes up to $2000 beyond the full grant-in-
aid level.12 Then, on December 15, 2011, the NCAA suspended 
                                                                                                                 
 6. During the recruiting process many high school athletes are lured to collegiate 
institutions through promises of “full ride” athletic scholarships without understanding that 
the full scholarships do not actually cover all costs of attending the school. 
 7. CARL I. FERTMAN, STUDENT-ATHLETE SUCCESS: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF 
COLLEGE LIFE 208 (2009). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.02.2, at 200 (calculating the “cost of 
attendance”). 
 10. See, e.g., Cost of Attendance and Expected Family Contribution, STUDENT LOAN 
NETWORK, http://www.studentloannetwork.com/financial-aid-101/costs-and-efc.php (last 
visited May 27, 2013) (“The cost of attendance (COA) is an estimate of how much it costs to 
attend college for one year, including all reasonable expenses.”). 
 11. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.1, at 202. 
 12. See Report of the October 27, 2011, Meeting of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association Division I Board of Directors (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:32 PM), 3-4, 
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/AMA/legislative_council/Jan%2012/Agenda%20and%20Supplement
s.pdf [hereinafter Division I Report]; Andy Gardiner, NCAA Enacts Broad Academic, 
Scholarship Reforms, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:32 PM), http://www.usatoday. 
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implementation of this change so the Division I Board of Directors could 
reconsider the amendment after 160 NCAA Division I member institutions 
objected to the change.13 If eventually allowed to be implemented, this 
change would allow athletic conferences to give their member institutions 
the opportunity to award more scholarship monies to individual student-
athletes.14 
However, this change is still not enough.15 It is an arbitrary price cap and 
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act16 because it prevents student-athletes from receiving financial aid up to 
the institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance, which includes the 
additional expenses an institution deems necessary to meet the cost of 
living at the school.17 Setting the permissible athletic scholarship limit to 
the institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance is a less restrictive 
alternative that still protects the pro-competitive virtues the NCAA has 
frequently proffered in support of this price cap.18 
The NCAA previously settled antitrust complaints brought by student-
athletes alleging that athletic scholarship limits were unreasonable restraints 
of trade.19 Now, the NCAA has recognized that settlement is not enough to 
fulfill its educational mission and preserve the rights of student-athletes in 
Division I programs. But, instead of retiring the deficient limit, the NCAA 
designated a new, arbitrary cap: $2000 above the full grant-in-aid limit.20 
                                                                                                                 
com/sports/college/story/2011-10-27/NCAA-board-approves-wide-range-of-reforms/50967 
250/1. 
 13. Steve Wieberg, NCAA to Modify $2,000 Stipend Proposal, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 
2012, 8:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-01-14/NCAA-stipend-
money/52559576/1. 
 14. See Gardiner, supra note 12 (noting that athletic conferences will have authority to 
voluntarily apply the increase in scholarship monies). 
 15. The proposed stipend passed on Oct. 27, 2011, would not alter this analysis; the 
estimated cost of attendance would still be greater than the proposed stipend fund, which 
ultimately only grants the athlete a maximum amount of $2000. See Division I Report, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 17. Division I Report, supra note 12, at 3. 
 18. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the 
NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 116 (2007) (“Courts have 
advanced amateurism as a procompetitive justification for a restraint on ‘trade or 
commerce’ . . . .”). 
 19. See, e.g., Amended Order, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 VBF (MANx) (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2008). 
 20. Division I Report, supra note 12, at 3. 
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In reconsidering the amendment to Bylaw 15.1, and in light of the recent 
settlement in White v. NCAA,21 the NCAA should fully liberalize Bylaw 
15.1 and allow institutions to award athletic scholarship monies up to the 
institutionally set, estimated costs of attendance because it is the only way 
to ensure all future Division I student-athletes are not financially 
disadvantaged simply for the hard work they undertake for institutions’ 
athletic programs, and because anything less is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.22 This article provides recommendations in the following order. Part I 
explores the background of White and subsequent cases leading to the most-
recent NCAA settlement agreement, which is still in operation. This 
agreement was the NCAA’s way of addressing student-athlete needs 
regarding scholarship monies’ deficient limit. Part II describes the current 
state of grant-in-aid programs and how this creates disadvantage among 
student-athletes because there is often great disparity in costs of attendance 
at Division I universities. Part III further describes the effects of this gap in 
financial assistance and the cost of living of student-athletes. Part IV 
discusses revenue and non-revenue-producing conferences and recognizes 
the impact of raising costs for member institutions in NCAA Division I. 
Part V explains that legislative change is necessary because settlement is 
insufficient to address the fundamental problem with the arbitrary price cap. 
Finally, Parts VI and VII culminate in a discussion of an antitrust challenge 
to the arbitrary price cap and the potential outcome of such a case if it were 
fully litigated, and how this outcome would affect the future of financial 
assistance for student-athletes in Division I athletics. Ultimately Parts VI 
and VII conclude that the NCAA should amend Bylaw 15.1 and allow 
institutions to award athletic scholarship monies up to the institutionally set, 
estimated cost of attendance because anything less would be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
I. The NCAA Settlement Agreement Addressing the Needs of Student-
Athletes Does Not Address the Needs of Student-Athletes 
In 2008, the NCAA reached a $10 million settlement agreement with the 
plaintiffs in an antitrust class action lawsuit which challenged the individual 
student-athlete scholarship limits set in NCAA Division I Bylaw 15.1.23 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 1-3, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 
VBF (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008). 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 23. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 10; see also Amended 
Order, supra note 19, at 1 (approving the settlement); Dennie, supra note 18, at 102-04; 
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This settlement was a response to a class action suit on behalf of former 
student-athletes: Jason White of Stanford University;24 Brian Polak of the 
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA);25 and other football and 
basketball students from revenue-producing Division I conferences.26 After 
a thorough review of the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement,27 it is 
clear that this resolution was merely a baby step toward providing all 
student-athletes the opportunity to receive the athletic scholarship monies 
they need, deserve, and were promised.28 Furthermore, had the parties fully 
litigated this case on the merits of the claim, NCAA Bylaw 15.1 would 
                                                                                                                 
Settlement in White Case Adds Flexibility to Distribution of Funds, NCAA (Aug 7, 2008, 
11:07 AM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2008/division+i/settlement%2 
Bin%2Bwhite%2Bcase%2Badds%2Bflexibility%2Bto%2Bdistribution%2Bof%2Bfunds%2
B-%2B08-07-08%2B-%2Bncaa%2Bnews.html (summarizing the settlement figures, 
distribution of funds, and the identities of the affected class in White). According to the class 
allegations, the individual student-athlete scholarship limit set in NCAA Division I Bylaw 
15.1 was an unlawful restraint of trade. Dennie, supra note 18, at 103. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the aid restriction should be amended to allow athletic-based financial 
aid up to the cost of attendance. Id. 
 24. See Jason White Profile, GOSTANFORD.COM, http://www.gostanford.com/sports/m-
footbl/mtt/white_jason00.html (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 25. See Brian Polak Profile, UCLABRUINS.COM, http://www.uclabruins.com/sports/m-
footbl/mtt/polak_brian00.html (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 26. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 6; see also Jack Carey & 
Andy Gardiner, NCAA Agrees to $10M Settlement in Antitrust Lawsuit, USA TODAY (Jan. 
30, 2008, 12:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-01-29-ncaa-settlement_ 
N.htm; Steve Wieberg, Concerns About NCAA Scholarship Settlement Raised, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 28, 2008, 10:27 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/other/2008-02-
28-scholarship-settlement_N.htm (“[T]he settlement require[d] the NCAA to make $10 
million available to football and basketball players over a three-year period—up to $7,500 a 
player—to cover future educational expenses.”). 
 27. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 10-12. 
 28. See In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. 
Wash. 2005). In that case, the plaintiffs were walk-on football players at Division I-A 
schools. Id. at 1146-47. The plaintiffs alleged that but for NCAA Bylaw 15.5.5, which 
restricted the number of football scholarships awarded by each school to eighty-five, they 
would have received full grant-in-aid scholarships. Id. at 1147. Therefore, the plaintiffs 
argued that the bylaw constituted an “unlawful horizontal restraint of trade” and violated the 
Sherman Act. Id.; see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender 
of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 350-52 (2007) (describing In re 
NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation and discussing its possible implications on 
the NCAA); Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar 
Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 332 (2005) (“College 
athletes have repeatedly brought suit to challenge the NCAA’s bylaws, principally on 
antitrust grounds, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so.”). 
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likely have been found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The White plaintiffs alleged that Bylaw 15.1 was an unlawful restraint of 
trade in violation of the Sherman Act29 because it was unreasonable for the 
NCAA Division I member institutions to agree to set the limit on the 
amount of money a Division I institution from a revenue-producing 
conference could offer its football and basketball student-athletes to an 
amount less than it actually cost to attend the institution.30 This price cap 
remains set at the value of a “full grant-in-aid,” which covers tuition cost, 
school fees, room and board, books, and other university required costs.31 
This amount does not currently include the “estimated cost of attendance”32 
at an institution. The difference between the estimated cost of attendance33 
and the full grant-in-aid is approximately $3000 annually, depending on the 
institution.34 As a result, a student-athlete who was offered a “full ride” 
receives, on average, $3000 less per year than the actual “full ride” 
promised because the NCAA forbids institutions from providing those 
monies to the student-athlete.35 Hence the “full ride” is illusory because the 
student-athlete must still find other means of financing this gap.36 
                                                                                                                 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 30. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 10-12. 
 31. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.02.5, at 201. 
 32. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 2-3 (explaining that 
the athletic-based “grants-in-aid,” which restricted the financial aid that a student-athlete 
could receive, were below the amount of the full cost of attendance). 
 33. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.02.2, at 200 (“The ‘cost of attendance’ is an 
amount calculated by an institutional financial aid office, using federal regulations, that 
includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, 
transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution.”). 
 34. See Associated Press, Study: ‘Free Ride’ Still Costs Athletes, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2010, 
1:08 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5728653; see also Tom Farrey, 
NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions, ESPN (Feb. 21, 2006, 3:01 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2337810. Mr. Farrey discusses how the 
NCAA’s full grant-in-aid for “full-ride” athletes places an artificial cap on a university’s 
estimated cost of attendance using Ramogi Huma, a former UCLA football player, as an 
example. Farrey, supra. As a UCLA linebacker in the late 1990s, Huma came from a lower-
income family and was promised a “full ride.” Id. But he received only the full grant-in-aid 
amount and left college with $6000 in credit card debt from the incidental expenses of 
attending college, such as phone bills and travel expenses. Id. 
 35. Associated Press, supra note 34. 
 36. See Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Defining 
Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 586 (2009) (discussing student-athletes’ financial 
dependence and the need for the NCAA and member institutions to liberalize their rules on 
accepting financial help). Ms. Fitt proposes liberalizing these rules to “reduce the athletes’ 
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This gap in scholarships is harmful because it creates a serious 
misperception of the actual financial risk associated with choosing to attend 
college.37 The financial risk is a disadvantage that student-athletes bear. 
However, other scholarship-receiving students do not bear this burden from 
receiving their financial assistance because these non-athlete students may 
receive scholarship monies and other financial aid awards up to the 
estimated cost of attendance.38 If student-athletes are receiving even one 
dollar in athletically related support from an institution, any other monies 
provided by the school, even awards not related to athletics, count toward 
the student-athlete’s individual scholarship limit, and are capped at an 
amount less than it actually costs to go to college.39 So, as expected, some 
student-athletes unwisely, but perhaps desperately, resort to violations of 
NCAA amateurism rules,40 such as accepting money from agents to help 
provide assistance to themselves and their families.41 This outcome is 
unfortunate, and is not an ideal way of financing the college experience 
because it may lead to serious problems for some student-athletes.42 
Under the terms of the settlement in White, the NCAA was required to 
make a total of $10 million available for three years to qualifying members 
                                                                                                                 
financial dependence upon the NCAA and its member institutions,” citing one example of a 
student-athlete who was sanctioned for accepting free groceries. Id. Her example highlights 
the economic dependency that the student-athlete has on the NCAA. Id. She also notes that 
the relationship between an institution and its athlete resembles an employer-employee 
relationship. Id. at 587. But “[b]y giving student-athletes the economic autonomy that most 
college students enjoy, the NCAA can remove itself from the role of financial dictator and 
eliminate the appearance of an employer-employee relationship.” Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the 
NCAA Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 199-200 (1996) (examining how 
NCAA restrictions on scholarships create a void between actual cost and real cost, and the 
impact to African American student-athletes). 
 38. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.1, at 202 (indicating that the NCAA's rules 
governing financial aid limits apply only to “student-athletes” as opposed to students in 
general). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. §§ 12.01-12.6, at 59-75. 
 41. See George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 18, 
2010, at 62, 62-67, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/ 
agent/index.html. Former NFL agent Josh Luchs described payments he made to college 
players. Id. at 64. When Luchs asked one player why the player did not sign with him after 
not receiving payment from Luchs, the athlete stated, “‘Sorry, I gotta do what is best for me 
and my family.’” Id. at 67. Likewise, other players confirmed that they accepted payments 
from agents “because their scholarship didn’t provide enough money for rent and food.” Id. 
at 64. 
 42. See Farrey, supra note 34. 
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of the class, to be distributed on a claims-made basis of up to $2500 per 
year per class member.43 This fund was for a maximum of three years per 
class member for future bona fide educational expenses incurred in 
connection with a program at an accredited institution.44 Also, there was a 
single payment from the NCAA available to student-athletes of up to $500 
to cover career development expenses incurred by members of the class.45 
Furthermore, the NCAA allowed individual institutions to use a pool of 
$218 million to address permissible, additional needs of student-athletes.46 
Although these terms, at the time, seemed to mend the problem of covering 
the harmful gap caused by not awarding student-athletes the value of the 
complete estimated cost of attendance, the terms did not prevent financial 
injury to future generations of football and basketball student-athletes at 
Division I member institutions;47 nor did the settlement terms address the 
disadvantages of other full-scholarship student-athletes who played neither 
football nor basketball.48 
The $218 million pool will eventually run out, but the claims brought by 
student-athletes will continue until a permanent remedy is in place.49 The 
real solution must include an appropriate amendment of Bylaw 15.1.50 The 
NCAA Division I Board of Directors has begun the process by attempting 
to amend Bylaw 15.1, perhaps compromising on the issue;51 however, the 
new $2000 stipend,52 if allowed to take effect, remains insufficient and 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 10–11. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 10. 
 47. See Doug Lederman, Settlement Raises Questions for NCAA, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Feb. 4, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/04/ncaa. Mr. 
Lederman notes that under the NCAA settlement, the NCAA would adopt a new rule 
permitting Division I schools to provide health and injury insurance. Id. He postulates that 
the ability to provide health and injury insurance may create tension between wealthier and 
less wealthy academic institutions because wealthier athletic programs might be able to 
afford these programs whereas the less wealthy might not. Id. 
 48. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 2 (including in the class 
of plaintiffs only persons who received athletic-based grants-in-aid from football and men’s 
basketball programs). 
 49. Matthew J. Mitten et al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 835 (2010) (discussing that, although the NCAA is 
willing to settle claims, the underlying issues such as antitrust claims remain at large). 
 50. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.1, at 202. 
 51. See Division I Report, supra note 12, at 3. 
 52. See Agenda: National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Legislative 
Council, STUDENT-ATHLETE WELL-BEING GROUP, 9 (Oct. 17-18, 2011) [hereinafter 
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arbitrary. Instead, the NCAA member institutions should make meaningful, 
permanent changes to benefit all student-athletes.53 
II. Current Grant-in-Aid Financial Aid Programs and the Differences in 
Costs of Attendance at Division I Universities 
The current grant-in-aid financial aid programs available to student-
athletes leave too many students in precarious positions. Bylaw 15.1, as it 
currently stands, falls short by creating a discrepancy in funding available 
to student-athletes from different schools depending on factors such as the 
cost of living in the city in which the school is located. Even the recent 
proposed change of adding a $2000 stipend for student-athletes does not 
adequately address the problem so long as the total amount is still below the 
institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance. 
A. Bylaw 15.1 and Its Limitations 
The NCAA’s settlement in White sounded great at the time. But in 
reality it was merely a temporary remedy because such a settlement was not 
enough to tackle the fundamental issues underlying the lawsuit. The NCAA 
should not limit the amount of scholarship money a college may offer a 
student-athlete to a value less than the institutionally set, estimated cost of 
attending the school.54 It simply does not make logical sense to limit 
scholarship monies to a deficient amount, especially for student-athletes 
who likely would not be able to afford matriculating on their own accord at 
Division I member institutions. 
NCAA Bylaw 15.1 limits an individual student-athlete’s athletic 
scholarships and other financial aid based on athletic ability to the value of 
a full grant-in-aid.55 Institutions set the estimated cost of attendance, which 
averages $3000 more than a full grant-in-aid,56 based on the particular cost 
                                                                                                                 
STUDENT-ATHLETE WELL-BEING GROUP], available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/AMA/legisla 
tive_council/Oct%2011/Agenda%20and%20Supplements.pdf. 
 53. See generally Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts 
of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 50–53 (2006) (discussing 
the NCAA legislative process in the amendments of bylaws). 
 54. Although “[c]ourts have advanced amateurism as a precompetitive justification for a 
restraint on ‘trade or commerce,’” the principle of amateurism should not limit the athlete to 
receive less scholarship money than the institutionally set, estimated cost of attending the 
school. See Dennie, supra note 18, at 116. (discussing the NCAA’s pro-competitive 
justifications for a restraint of trade). 
 55. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.1, at 202. 
 56. Associated Press, supra note 34. 
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of living expenses every student will face when arriving on campus.57 The 
NCAA press release following the White settlement stated: “The NCAA 
believes the full-ride scholarship currently offered is appropriate for the 
majority of student-athletes.”58 That sentiment might have been true at the 
time, but legislative reform was necessary to achieve a more equitable 
result.59 And, by attempting to permit conferences to allow member 
institutions to award $2000 stipends above the full grant-in-aid, the 
Division I Board of Directors recently recognized that the “full ride” 
scholarship award then-available is no longer appropriate.60 Yet, what is 
even more apparent now is that further reform is still necessary to avoid 
future lawsuits by other student-athletes who both were not members or 
potential members of the White class and attend schools where the $2000 
stipend option is still insufficient to cover the costs of college attributed to 
the gap between the full grant-in-aid and the institutionally set, estimated 
cost of attendance.61 
B. Differences in Costs of Attendance at Division I Universities 
The NCAA oversees athletics at member institutions across the United 
States.62 The cities and towns where NCAA member institutions are located 
can be quite different from one another, and these differences result in a 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.02.5, at 201 (defining full grant-in-
aid), with id. § 15.02.2, at 200 (defining cost of attendance). 
 58. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Statement in Settlement of White Case (Feb. 5, 
2008), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2008/Official%2BStatements/NCA 
A%2BStatement%2Bin%2BSettlement%2Bof%2BWhite%2BCase.html. 
 59. See generally Lazaroff, supra note 28, at 361-71. Professor Lazaroff discusses 
trends within modern antitrust litigation that the NCAA has encountered, focusing on courts’ 
dichotomous approaches in deciding these cases. Id. at 332-37. He notes that in antitrust 
cases that do not involve players, the courts tend to reach similar results to those in 
professional sports, but that courts reach significantly different conclusions (generally in 
favor of the NCAA) when student-athlete restraints are being challenged. Id. at 340. 
Professor Lazaroff further discusses the blurring of these standards in light of the economic 
realities of a true market for college athletics and offers solutions to this problem that 
include changes in judicial philosophy, NCAA regulatory reform, or legislative reform. Id. at 
350, 361-71; see also Michael Aguirre, Comment, From Locker Rooms to Legislatures: 
Student-Athletes Turn Outside the Game to Improve the Score, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1441, 1453-
59 (2004) (reviewing legislative attempts by student-athletes to reform the current standards 
of duration and amount of scholarships offered to student-athletes and explaining that the 
financial ramifications of including an extra $2000 for additional expenses are unknown). 
 60. STUDENT-ATHLETE WELL-BEING GROUP, supra note 52. 
 61. See id.; Associated Press, supra note 34. 
 62. See NCAA Map, COLLEGESPORTSINFO.COM, http://collegesportsinfo.com/ncaa-map/ 
(last visited May 27, 2013). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/2
2013] THE MYTH OF THE “FULL RIDE” 617 
 
 
vast array of actual costs to the individual student-athletes throughout the 
NCAA member institutions. These costs range from food and utilities to 
transportation and housing. These costs are very real to each student-
athlete, and the differences in cost can be dramatic. 
As an example, Iowa State University, which competes in the Big 12 
Conference,63 is located in Ames, Iowa.64 Meanwhile, UCLA, which is a 
member of the Pac-12 Conference,65 is located in Los Angeles, California.66 
Ames is 32% less expensive to live in than Los Angeles.67 The biggest 
difference is that housing and associated utilities and fees in Ames are 54% 
less expensive than in Los Angeles.68 These are costs that students in more 
expensive cities will be forced to take on themselves because the NCAA 
does not allow member institutions to provide coverage for expenses like 
housing (other than on-campus room and board) and utilities. Therefore, 
$2000 worth of incidental living expenses in Los Angeles would only cost 
$1354 in Ames.69 
There are even examples of disparities in costs within the same state. 
Both St. John’s University and Syracuse University are members of the Big 
East Conference70 and both schools are in New York. St. John’s University 
is located in Queens, New York City,71 and Syracuse University is located 
in Syracuse.72 The City of Syracuse is 39% less expensive to live in than 
Queens.73 The cost of housing and associated utilities and fees in Syracuse 
is 74% less expensive than Queens.74 Therefore, $2000 worth of incidental 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See BIG 12 CONFERENCE, http://www.big12sports.com/ (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 64. See Contact Us, IOWA STATE UNIV., http://www.iastate.edu/contact/ (last visited 
May 27, 2013). 
 65. See PAC-12, http://pac-12.com/ (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 66. See Contact, UCLA, http://www.ucla.edu/contact.html (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 67. Cost of Living Comparison: Los Angeles, California – Ames, Iowa, SPERLING’S 
BEST PLACES, http://www.bestplaces.net/col/?salary=2000&city1=50644000&city2=5190 
1855 (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Big East Member Schools, BIG EAST CONFERENCE, http://www.bigeast.org/ 
AbouttheBIGEAST/MemberSchools.aspx (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 71. See Contact Us, ST. JOHN’S UNIV., http://www.stjohns.edu/contact.stj (last visited 
May 27, 2013). 
 72. See Contact Us, SYRACUSE UNIV., http://www.syr.edu/contact/index.html (last 
visited May 27, 2013). 
 73. Cost of Living Comparison: Queens (Queens), New York – Syracuse, New York, 
SPERLING’S BEST PLACES, http://www.bestplaces.net/col/?salary=2000&city1=43608100& 
city2=53673000 (last visited May 27, 2013). 
 74. Id. 
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living expenses in Queens would only cost $1229 in Syracuse.75 These are 
real expenses that demonstrate the inadequacy of the NCAA settlement in 
White and any potential amendment to Bylaw 15.1 that tries to set a 
universal price cap. 
III. Student-Athlete Struggles Created by Financial-Aid Gaps and the 
Standards of Living for Intercollegiate Athletes 
The NCAA needs to demonstrate that one of its top priorities is access to 
the opportunities that collegiate athletics offer. If the NCAA’s mission truly 
is to make the educational experience paramount,76 change is necessary 
because it presently hinders the educational experience77 by not allowing 
student-athletes to obtain athletic scholarship monies that they do not just 
need, but deserve. According to a recent study by Ithaca College 
Researchers, the average Division I athlete receiving a full-ride scholarship 
pays $2951 in school-related expenses not covered by grants-in-aid.78 The 
study found that describing scholarships as “full” or “free rides” was a 
deceptive practice on the part of recruiters because the “price tag . . . falls 
short of the scholarship amount.”79 Some coaches tend to be more careful 
about detailing the financial aid package to athletes; however, this diligence 
does not remedy the issue.80 
A. The NCAA’s Purpose and Goals of Amateurism 
Perhaps part of the resistance to increasing the individual student-athlete 
scholarship limit to the estimated cost of attendance is a fear that such a 
scholarship award would jeopardize the public perception of amateurism in 
college sports, as the NCAA is the great protector of college sports 
remaining a realm of amateur athletics. The NCAA Division I Manual 
explains: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See id. 
 76. Eye on the Money, supra note 4. 
 77. Michael P. Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation 
of College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 344-45 (1998) (stating that NCAA amateur 
rules are promulgated to promote revenue for the schools, not to preserve the educational 
experience of players). Mr. Acain also notes that student-athletes’ performances create 
substantial revenue for their institutions, but the student-athletes are not allowed to receive 
even a portion of this revenue. Id. 
 78. Associated Press, supra note 34. 
 79. Id. (quoting Ramogi Huma, Nat’l Coll. Players Ass’n) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 80. Id. 
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their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the 
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in 
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be 
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”81 
Thus, the NCAA’s purpose in this regard is not only “to maintain 
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program,” but 
also to “retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics 
and professional sports.”82 And a crucial factor distinguishing the amateur 
athlete from the professional athlete is that the professional athlete is paid 
for his or her athletic ability. However, the NCAA operates in complete 
contradiction to its purpose as stated above because it engages in 
commercial enterprises83 and generates significant revenues from the big 
business of “amateur collegiate athletics.”84 Yet, the NCAA requires 
student-athletes to retain their amateur statuses and prevents institutions 
from offering their student-athletes shares of the collegiate athletics revenue 
pie to fill the gaps in necessary expenses for degree completion.85 
B. The Real Cost of College Living 
With this article, we are not advocating for offering student-athletes 
more than the estimated cost of attendance because doing so would 
contravene our own understandings of “amateur” athletics86 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.9, at 4. 
 82. Id. § 1.3.1, at 1; see also Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 83. Acain, supra note 77, at 343-45; see also Video: Panel III: NCAA as a Commercial 
Enterprise (Boston College Law School 2010), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/ 
law/newsevents/events/conferences/ncaa_symp_video.html. 
 84. See Fritz G. Polite et al., Social Accountability and Responsibility in Sport: An 
Examination of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 20 SPORT SCIENCE REV. 111, 
122-29 (2011), available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ssr.2011.xx.issue-1-2/v10237-
011-0050-7/v10237-011-0050-7.xml?format=INT (select “Full Text PDF”). 
 85. See Orion Riggs, Note, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major College 
Athletics, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138-41, 144 (1996) (discussing both the NCAA 
operating as a big business while giving little money in scholarships to student-athletes and 
that student-athletes must be permitted to receive a share of the profits they generate to 
achieve equity). 
 86. See Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles a Student-Athlete’s Dream, 12 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 221, 225-33 (2005) (discussing the policy and rationale behind amateur athletics). 
The authors concur in Mr. Dennie’s explanation of the meaning of “amateurism” within the 
world of college athletics. “‘An amateur athlete is one who participates in competitive 
physical sports only for the pleasure and the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits 
directly derived therefrom.’” Id. at 225 (quoting Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has 
Evolved Over Time, NCAA NEWS (Jan. 3, 2000, 4:07 PM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAA 
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traditional spirit of college sports.87 However, if “full-ride” athletes pay on 
average $3000 per year88 for such out of pocket expenses as health 
insurance, phone and cable bills, transportation, laundry, toiletries, food, 
and entertainment,89 then some student-athletes will still be unable to bear 
the financial burden of degree completion. “Full-ride” athletes have 
graduated from college with thousands of dollars in credit card debt90 
because they had no other resources to cover those expenses not included in 
a full grant-in-aid.91 Even worse are the instances of full scholarship 
athletes who have incurred such significant financial debt in their first two 
years of college that they are unable to continue their educations because of 
the actual costs of going to college and their inabilities to stay ahead of their 
debts.92 
Many “full-ride” athletes come from low-income households93 and are 
only able to go to college because of their athletic abilities and the near-
comprehensive athletic scholarships some institutions can offer.94 Low-
income amateur athletes should not be expected to pay to play collegiate 
sports when the agreed-upon goal is degree completion and all that students 
have to offer are their athletic abilities to see them through four years of 
education. These students would most likely not be able to attend Division I 
institutions without full athletic scholarships.95 So, it is logical to let 
institutions offer comprehensive aid packages. 
                                                                                                                 
NewsArchive/2000/association-wide/debate%2Bon%2Bamateurism%2Bhas%2Bevolved%2 
Bover%2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html). 
 87. Id. at 225-33. Justice Stevens noted the role of the NCAA in maintaining a 
distinction between amateur and professional sports, stating that the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the NCAA “as the guardian of an important American tradition”: 
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 
(1984). Justice Stevens also stated that collegiate athletes must not be paid so as “to preserve 
the character and quality of the ‘product.’” Id. at 102. 
 88. Associated Press, supra note 34. 
 89. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.02.5, at 201 (defining full grant-in-aid 
to cover “tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books”), with id. § 
15.02.2, at 200 (defining cost of attendance to cover the full grant-in-aid amount and “other 
expenses related to attendance at the institution”). 
 90. See Farrey, supra note 34. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Marc Jenkins, Comment, The United Student-Athletes of America: Should College 
Athletes Organize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercollegiate 
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Even if we were to look at these expenses as frivolous and unnecessary, 
and suggest that “full-ride” athletes need not have a car, or enjoy pizza with 
friends, or see a movie at the cinema,96 by limiting athletic scholarships 
NCAA Bylaw 15.1 imposes a lower standard of living on the many “full-
ride” athletes who do not have the ability to pay for these things than on 
members of the general student body. And student-athletes already have 
less time to earn money through part-time employment97 than members of 
the general student body might have.98 Student-athletes already “work” 
twenty hours per week training and competing on behalf of their colleges;99 
they should not have to go into debt to do so if they have been promised 
elusive “full rides.” 
IV. Revenue-Producing and Non-Revenue-Producing Conferences and the 
Impact of Raising Costs on Member Institutions 
The class members in the White case were football and basketball 
athletes.100 However, we can look beyond the financial chasm of the “full-
ride” football and basketball student-athletes from Division I revenue-
producing conferences101 and see that all “full-ride” student-athletes should 
have the ability to secure comprehensive scholarship packages up to the 
estimated costs of attendance. Problems caused by the scholarship gap are 
not limited to football and basketball players; rather, some “full-ride” field 
                                                                                                                 
Athletics?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 39, 41 (2003) (discussing the organization of student-
athletes to help protect their rights and give them a greater voice in amateur athletics). 
 96. See Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism 
as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 26-27 
(2000) (discussing the issues athletes face compared to non-athletes or non-students). 
 97. Dennie, supra note 86, at 247 n.207. 
 98. See Eric J. Sobocinski, College Athletes: What Is Fair Compensation?, 7 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 257, 262 (1996) (arguing that being a student-athlete amounts to “two full-time 
jobs: full-time student and big-time athlete”). 
 99. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 17.1.6.1, at 244; Robert A. McCormick & 
Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as 
Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 99 & n.127 (2006). 
 100. See NCAA to Pay $228 Million for Male Athletes, WOMEN HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25418044 (discussing how the White settlement might not 
apply comprehensively to all student-athletes, namely women, in the future, and the 
possibility of future problems with covering the incidental expenses after the funds from the 
White settlement run out). 
 101. Revenue-producing conferences are the main focus in the business of NCAA 
Division I athletics; much of the revenue is generated by the football and basketball 
programs. But whether a sport generates revenue does not matter because the scholarship 
gap is a problem that can affect all student-athletes in all conferences. 
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hockey, soccer, and volleyball players have to pay out-of-pocket for living 
expenses too. Likewise, some “full-ride” swimmers, rowers, and gymnasts 
undoubtedly come from low-income households. The argument suggesting 
that, because these are not revenue-producing sports,102 these athletes 
should not be able to tap into institutional resources up to their estimated 
costs of attendance because this money probably was generated by the 
successful football and basketball teams is not persuasive.103 The standout 
swimmer or track athlete represents an institution honorably at the highest 
level both on the field and in the classroom, regardless of whether she 
brings in revenue for the institution. Schools know of this value, which is 
why they offer these sports to their students.104 If an institution has the 
money and wants to offer athletics scholarship money up to the estimated 
cost of attending that institution, it should be able to do so.105 
V. Settlement Is Not the Answer for Meaningful Change in Collegiate 
Athletics 
Settlement is not the answer for meaningful change in collegiate 
athletics. Instead, changing the NCAA bylaws to reflect the best interests of 
the student-athletes will lead to a better future for Division I athletics. 
Indeed, the NCAA will continue to face scrutiny if the current system of 
collegiate athletic scholarships is not changed. As recently as 2010, in a 
federal antitrust class action, college athletes filed a complaint stating, 
“[T]he NCAA and its member colleges ‘unlawfully conspired to maintain 
the price of bachelor’s degrees for NCAA student-athletes at artificially 
high levels,’ by agreeing never to offer multi-year athletics scholarships, 
and capping the number of athletics scholarships that schools can offer.”106 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Pekron, supra note 96, at 29 (noting that universities value sports differently). In 
particular, football and basketball are viewed differently from other sports offered because 
these are two of the highest producing sports in terms of revenue. Id. 
 103. See generally Fund-Raising Is Part of the Game for Some College Athletes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/24/sports/24iht-WEBCASH.7241 
256.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how non-revenue-producing sports teams are trying to 
keep their programs afloat). 
 104. See DOMINIC J. BREWER ET AL., IN PURSUIT OF PRESTIGE: STRATEGY AND 
COMPETITION IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION 135 (2002) (discussing how winning sports teams 
generate prestige for universities). 
 105. See Jenkins, supra note 95, at 40-41 (discussing the college athletics industry and 
the money gained by member institutions). 
 106. Maria Dinzeo, Student-Athletes Strike at Heart of NCAA Scholarship Restrictions, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 27, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2010/10/27/31394.htm (discussing a newly filed complaint in Agnew v. NCAA by student-
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And we posit that, had an antitrust challenge to Bylaw 15.1 been fully 
litigated, the restriction on scholarship monies would likely fail the rule of 
reason test and be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act.107 
VI. What if These Antitrust Challenges to the NCAA Scholarship Limits 
Were Fully Litigated? A Hypothetical Antitrust Challenge 
to NCAA Bylaw 15.1 
A. Overview 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, any contract or conspiracy to cause 
an “unreasonable restraint[] of trade” is illegal.108 For a hypothetical 
plaintiff class of “full ride” student-athletes to prevail on a section 1 
Sherman Act challenge to Bylaw 15.1, even with the $2000 stipend over the 
full grant-in-aid amount, the plaintiff class would need to show that the 
NCAA member institutions colluded to “unreasonably restrain[] trade in the 
relevant market” through Bylaw 15.1.109 Under Bylaw 15.1, the conduct 
that restrains trade is the direct input price cap a school may offer in 
scholarships for prospective and continuing student-athletes. 
By setting such a price ceiling, the NCAA is acting to protect the 
amateur image of intercollegiate athletics and, perhaps, attempting to 
protect less successful schools from having to compete in an open market 
with more financially-successful schools that might be willing and able to 
pay for all the costs associated with degree completion for student-
athletes.110 “Full ride” student-athletes have challenged and will continue to 
challenge this scholarship limit because they pay, on average, the $3000 in 
collegiate expenses which some schools might otherwise be willing to offer 
them.111 
                                                                                                                 
athletes and the issues regarding the NCAA and student-athlete based scholarships); see also 
In re NCAA 1-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., No. C04-1254C, 2006 WL 1207915, at 
*1 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (plaintiffs of an attempted class action alleged that limiting the 
number of available scholarships was an illegal restraint of trade). 
 107. See infra Part VI. 
 108. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 109. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 110. See Andy Staples, Regardless of Motives, Addressing Scholarship Shortfall a Good 
Thing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 20, 2011, updated 12:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
com/2011/writers/andy_staples/05/20/paying-players-attendance-cost/index.html. 
 111. See, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 21, at 2-3; see also 
Associated Press, supra note 34. 
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As such, Bylaw 15.1 amounts to “classic cartel”112 control by the NCAA 
that violates section 1 of the Sherman Act because: (1) the scholarship limit 
amounts to a horizontal restraint among member institutions that compete 
for the best student-athletes,113 and (2) it is unreasonable to place a cap on 
scholarship amounts that is less than the estimated cost of attendance 
because the anticompetitive effect outweighs the pro-competitive virtues of 
such a restraint.114 
The NCAA rule prevents the numerous buyers and sellers (colleges and 
universities) from acting independently and rationally, and turns the NCAA 
into a price (scholarship amount) setter.115 Although combining to form an 
athletic association in general reduces independence because the schools 
are dependent on the association to establish rules and guidelines,116 
establishing scholarship caps is an additional barrier to independence in an 
area where schools would otherwise compete for student-athletes.117 In an 
antitrust challenge to Bylaw 15.1, the NCAA might argue that by 
standardizing scholarship calculations it is encouraging student-athletes to 
select schools based on factors other than financial packages; however, this 
“educational” goal will not remove the price cap from antitrust scrutiny. 
Applying these principles here, by dictating the amount of athletic 
scholarship monies available the NCAA becomes a price setter.118 The 
product is collegiate athletics, and placing an individual student-athlete 
scholarship limit is an unnatural input restriction in creating the product. To 
establish a natural equilibrium price, the market participants should instead 
base their decisions on the supply of student-athletes and the demand for 
student-athletes driven by available scholarship funds. That being said, 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 96 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 
1276, 1300-01 (W.D. Okla. 1982)). 
 113. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1017-19. 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 1019-21. 
 115. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105-06, 120. 
 116. See id. at 117-18.  
 117. For example, when a group of universities shared information regarding calculating 
need-based scholarships, the government challenged the practice. United States v. Brown 
Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev’d, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a defendant, argued that the universities were not 
competing for students in “trade or commerce” and should be permitted to share need-based 
calculations to encourage students to select schools based on factors other than cost. Id. at 
296, 302. However, the district court held that even providing a public service of education 
was insufficient to allow anticompetitive effects. Id. at 307. The court of appeals reversed 
and remanded because the district court applied a truncated “rule of reason analysis.” Brown 
Univ., 5 F.3d at 661. 
 118. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105-06, 120. 
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unlike professional sports, there is already an external “cap” on the 
equilibrium price because it is historically accepted that the amount of 
scholarship monies a student-athlete receives should not exceed the costs of 
collegiate education (because it would contravene notions of 
amateurism).119 Because we value the “amateur” nature of college sports, 
we allow the market to be influenced by this external constraint. Because of 
this value judgment, the impact of price fixing by the NCAA enforcing 
Bylaw 15.1 is limited, but still impactful, and requires antitrust scrutiny. 
In response to such a challenge, the NCAA might also, initially, argue 
that the system of amateur athletics is a public good that cannot exist in a 
perfectly competitive market and that Bylaw 15.1 is just one part of the 
NCAA’s broad program of self-regulation that exists for the purpose of 
maintaining a line of demarcation between amateur and professional sports. 
However, moving the cutoff from not allowing student-athletes to be paid 
for their participation to not being able to support their full educational 
costs needs antitrust scrutiny and must be supported by the NCAA’s pro-
competitive rationale for the rule. 
Therefore, the real issue underlying a hypothetical lawsuit would be: 
Why limit the amount of scholarship money a college can offer a student-
athlete to a value less than the cost of attendance? This choice is difficult 
for the NCAA to justify. 
B. Threshold Issues: Is the NCAA’s Conduct Within a Potential Antitrust 
Argument? 
A threshold issue is whether by enforcing Bylaw 15.1 the NCAA’s 
questionable conduct affects interstate commerce and therefore must 
comply with the Sherman Act.120 Another threshold question regarding a 
section 1 Sherman Act challenge to Bylaw 15.1 is whether there was the 
requisite duality: that there was an agreement made between economic 
rivals, and not solely the conduct of a single entity, to unreasonably restrain 
trade in the relevant market.121 
The NCAA represents a group of universities joining together to create 
cooperative agreements.122 This coming-together makes each NCAA bylaw 
a type of horizontal agreement. Here, the NCAA and its member 
institutions entered into a horizontal agreement to impose the scholarship 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Whether the state of NCAA Division I athletics truly is amateur, professional, or 
quasi-professional is a dialogue beyond the scope of this article. 
 120. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911). 
 121. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99. 
 122. Id. 
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restraint by a majority vote to pass Bylaw 15.1. Thus, the section 1 duality 
requirement is met. 
The conduct susceptible to antitrust scrutiny is the NCAA’s 
implementation and enforcement of a rule that limits athletic scholarships to 
a value of tuition, fees, room and board, and books. Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”123 This conduct fits section 1 
because the NCAA Division I member institutions made an agreement in 
the form of NCAA rules, including Bylaw 15.1, to which all NCAA 
Division I members agreed to abide by, thus making a conspiracy legally 
feasible.124 
The NCAA would, however, likely allege that there is no collusion 
because member institutions are acting as a single entity with respect to 
Bylaw 15.1 within the context of determining student-athlete scholarship 
limits for the purpose of maintaining amateur competition. And, in 
protecting the value of amateurism in college sports, all NCAA member 
institutions have a unity of interest and thus are a single entity.125 However, 
this would be a far stretch of the “unity of interest” theory and courts 
historically have not agreed.126 
Bylaw 15.1 clearly affects interstate commerce, thus subjecting it to 
section 1 scrutiny in an antitrust suit. The NCAA is a national association of 
universities and colleges and their sports teams that operate on a mutually 
dependent level by means of games, competitions, or events which take 
place across state borders and are broadcast nationally.127 Further, NCAA 
                                                                                                                 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 124. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99. 
 125. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770-71 (1984). 
 126. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212, 2214 
(2010) (stating that Copperweld is narrowly applied). 
 127. Of course, the NCAA also could argue that by imposing athletic scholarship limits 
under Bylaw 15.1, it is not subject to section 1 Sherman Act liability because it imposes such 
limits to achieve the legitimate and noncommercial goal of making education the highest 
priority in amateur athletics. The NCAA could further argue that such limits are not an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, but rather a small part of the NCAA’s wide-ranging scheme 
of self-regulation that is implemented for the purpose of preserving the line of distinction 
between amateur and professional athletics. The Supreme Court recognized this argument in 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States. 435 U.S. 679, 698-99 (1978). 
The NCAA would likely add that it has the legitimate and noncommercial goals of 
preserving the distinction between amateur and professional athletics, providing the public 
with the public good of amateur athletics, and maintaining the line of distinction between 
amateur and professional athletics in order to provide a unique product. 
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Division I athletic programs compete for, recruit, offer financial aid to, and 
admit prospective student-athletes from across the United States. Bylaw 
15.1 affects the amount and terms of financial aid available to these 
individual prospective student-athletes because institutions’ offers to these 
prospects are capped at the full grant-in-aid amounts, and the institutions 
are prevented from covering the additional costs associated with 
matriculation. 
C. Scholarship Caps as a Form of Price Fixing 
A firm may partake in price fixing by affecting its supply.128 Here, it can 
be alleged that the NCAA (the “firm”) is restricting the supply of financial 
aid money to student-athletes by capping scholarships at an amount below 
the actual cost of attending college. However, in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., the Court held that there is no such thing as a reasonable 
price cap so long as it is artificially set, and that such conduct is thus a per 
se violation of the Sherman Act.129 In sports litigation, however, the per se 
analysis is almost always abandoned in favor of the more subjective 
burden-shifting review of the rule of reason.130 In Board of Trade of 
Chicago v. United States, the Court held that if “the restraint imposed [was] 
such as merely regulate[d] and perhaps thereby promote[d] competition,” 
then such restraint was not unlawful under the Sherman Act.131 The factors 
considered included: the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint 
was applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; and 
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.132 Other factors 
included the history of the restraint and the evil believed to exist, the reason 
for adopting the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be 
attained.133 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940). 
 129. Id. at 223. 
 130. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 131. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 132. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 691 (discussing Board of Trade of 
Chicago). A conclusion that a restraint of trade is unreasonable may: 
[B]e based either (1) on the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on 
surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they 
were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices. Under either branch of the 
test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive 
conditions. 
Id. at 690 (footnotes omitted) (describing the test for reasonableness set forth in Standard 
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911)). 
 133. Id. at 692. 
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Applying those factors here, the facts peculiar to the business are that the 
NCAA is an amateur sports association and it intends to maintain the 
amateur status of collegiate athletics. There are no facts to indicate the 
condition of the NCAA or its students before the scholarship rule was put 
into place, but the conditions after include that students are damaged by not 
receiving enough money to cover their college costs.134 Another condition 
is that the NCAA has successfully remained an amateur association because 
it has kept the financial aid arms race at a fundamental level. The nature of 
the effect and the history of the restraint show a legitimate reason for which 
the NCAA has opted to keep scholarship limits at a level that ensures 
amateurism in college sports. 
D. Is Bylaw 15.1 an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade? 
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent an unreasonable restraint 
of trade.135 Of course, all economic activity restrains trade in some way, but 
the Sherman Act forbids restraints of trade that harm the public 
consumer.136 The consumer of collegiate athletics has an interest in the 
product being produced—that is, the games. But this consumer interest does 
not directly reduce the availability of college athletics. Because student-
athletes will face, on average, the same $3000 cost increase at all schools 
that were able to offer full scholarships previously, the impact on the 
product will be limited to any student-athletes who are unable to attend any 
university because of the cost increase. 
On its face, Bylaw 15.1 directly imposes a price cap on the amount of 
financial aid any student-athlete may receive in the form of an athletic 
scholarship.137 Under the rule of reason test, a plaintiff must first establish 
the anticompetitive effect of the suspect action.138 A plaintiff would cite to 
the price ceiling, which restrains a school’s ability to compete for student-
athletes. A plaintiff also would allege that the NCAA had arbitrarily set the 
price ceiling at an amount lower than the actual cost of collegiate education 
as an indication that the price ceiling is unreasonable, preventing schools 
from paying for the full cost of education for athletes that generate more 
revenue than they are rewarded with in scholarship monies. 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See FERTMAN, supra note 7, at 208. 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 136. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 62. 
 137. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.1, at 202. 
 138. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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The burden would then shift to the NCAA to proffer the pro-competitive 
virtues that the rule is intended to accomplish.139 The NCAA would insist 
Bylaw 15.1 is part of a broad range of rules that maintain the amateur 
aspects of collegiate athletics, and that this price ceiling is important to 
protect smaller schools and to allow them to compete for student-athlete 
talent. Although amateur athletics is based on the notion that players are not 
paid to compete,140 this ideal is useless without a concrete standard. 
Therefore, the NCAA will point to the need for a clear guideline for schools 
to follow. By tying the scholarship limit to objectively measurable 
numbers—that is, the full grant-in-aid—Bylaw 15.1 provides the needed 
certainty to all institutions. 
But a plaintiff would likely be able to establish that the anticompetitive 
effects outweigh the alleged pro-competitive virtues141 because either: (1) 
the rationale behind Bylaw 15.1 is not legitimate, or (2) the rule is not 
sufficiently narrowly-tailored to achieve these pro-competitive objectives 
because there is a less restrictive alternative. A plaintiff in the hypothetical 
case would argue that the same pro-competitive goals could be achieved by 
a rule that simply forbids scholarships that compensate a student-athlete 
beyond the necessary educational expenses to achieve degree completion, 
which is the amount the central administrative financial aid office at the 
institution sets as the yearly estimated-cost-of-attendance amount. Although 
the NCAA could set forth a guideline that stated that tuition, fees, room and 
board, and books are established expenses that will be accepted in all 
instances, thereby providing clarity to institutions, the additional expenses 
that cost on average $3000 can be reimbursed by the institutions if they are 
properly documented. None of the pro-competitive virtues are enabled by 
setting the scholarship limit at about $3000 below the institutionally set, 
estimated cost of attendance. Because the pro-competitive rationales do not 
address this contention, the rule should fail as not narrowly-tailored to the 
desired benefits.142 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Dennie, supra note 86, at 225-33. 
 141. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
 142. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984) (requiring the NCAA’s 
interest to be tailored specifically to further said interest). Of course, the dissenting Justices 
from Board of Regents would likely hold that this restriction is justified under the general 
powers of the organization. See id. at 123-24 (White, J., dissenting). To achieve the goal of 
bringing together universities from around the country to participate in these games, the 
NCAA needs the authority to make rules and limitations. Unlike a restriction on the number 
of televised games available to a particular school, the NCAA does not regulate, nor could it 
regulate, the quality (and therefore price) of education that can be provided under the tuition 
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Therefore, because there is a less restrictive means to accomplish the 
pro-competitive virtues of protecting the amateur status of collegiate 
athletics, a court will likely hold that this rule is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
E. Rule of Reason Analysis 
By their nature, almost all contracts restrain trade to some extent: “Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.”143 In fact, 
sometimes “certain products require . . . restraints . . . in order to exist at 
all,” and thus there must be some agreements by the member institutions.144 
Because sports leagues and the teams therein rely on each other in a 
mutually dependent manner to produce the product of collegiate sports 
entertainment, there must be some level of agreement, or collusion, by the 
member institutions of the NCAA. For this reason, the rule of reason 
analysis is almost always applied in determining whether there has been an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
instead of per se analysis. Because there are almost always pro-competitive 
virtues, such as scheduling, skills rules, and playing conditions, which 
would make the restraint of trade reasonable, there is no per se violation of 
the Sherman Act. 
Therefore, whether the agreement between the NCAA member 
institutions represented by Bylaw 15.1 causes an unreasonable restraint of 
trade will depend almost entirely on whether a plaintiff class can prove that 
the restraint is unreasonable. To determine if the restraint is unreasonable, a 
court will apply either the per se rule or the rule of reason test.145 Despite 
these schools competing for students, for fans, for donor support, etc., the 
courts generally have not treated the horizontal agreements of the NCAA 
members institution as per se violations of the Sherman Act, even when 
they involve price fixing, because college sports is “an industry in which 
                                                                                                                 
component. By leaving this and other areas for competition, the NCAA could convince a 
court to accept its pro-competitive rationales as justified because there are other areas within 
which schools may compete. In Justice White’s dissent, he mentioned how the NCAA 
regulates compensation. Id. at 123. Although this formula decreases the amount of aid that 
can be given to a student-athlete to below the amount that would be available under a rule 
that allowed full compensation of collegiate expenses, it is applied equally to all schools that 
are competing with full scholarship athletes. 
 143. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 144. Law, 134 F.3d at 1017 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 23 (1979)). 
 145. Id. at 1016–17. 
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horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.”146 
Because of Board of Regents, a court would not analyze Bylaw 15.1 as a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act.147 The NCAA is the “great protector” 
of amateur athletics148 and, therefore, is given deference to pass regulations 
that would not otherwise be permissible.149 For example, even when the 
NCAA limited annual compensation for Division I basketball coaches, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the proper standard for analyzing such a limit was 
the rule of reason test.150 The per se standard, which declined in usage after 
Standard Oil,151 is only appropriate when the anticompetitive conduct is so 
obvious that it negates any evidence of pro-competitive virtues.152 Thus, the 
court must determine whether there is a pro-competitive rationale for the 
allegedly anticompetitive action.153 
1. Under the Rule of Reason Test, Bylaw 15.1 Is an Unreasonable 
Restraint of Trade in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
The rule of reason analysis under section 1 requires the finder of fact to 
partake in a burden-shifting analysis by weighing the pro-competitive 
virtues of the conduct at issue against the conduct’s anticompetitive 
effects.154 And “[u]nder a rule of reason analysis, an agreement to restrain 
trade may still survive scrutiny under section 1 if the procompetitive 
benefits of the restraint justify the anticompetitive effects.”155 Justifications 
offered under the rule of reason analysis may be considered only to the 
extent they show that, on balance, “the challenged restraint enhances 
competition.”156 In Law, the Tenth Circuit said that “the only legitimate 
rationales that we will recognize . . . are those necessary to produce 
competitive intercollegiate sports.”157 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Joe Nocera, Op.-Ed., The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A23, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/nocera-the-college-sports-cartel. 
html. 
 149. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. 
 150. Law, 134 F.3d at 1012, 1019. 
 151. This is especially true in the sports realm. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100. 
 152. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
 153. Id. at 1016-17. 
 154. Id. at 1019. 
 155. Id. at 1021. 
 156. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104. 
 157. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021 (referencing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117). 
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In Board of Regents, the Court held that sometimes horizontal restraints 
are necessary to create certain commodities,158 and thus a per se test is 
inappropriate unless the restraint on its face is completely void of any pro-
competitive rationales.159 Thus, the rule of reason balancing test is 
employed to determine whether a restraint is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.160 In Board of Regents, the Court applied the rule of reason test and 
held that the NCAA output market restriction regarding televised college 
football games constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.161 The Court 
explained that a restraint of trade could be unreasonable “based either (1) 
on the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding 
circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were 
intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.”162 Justice Stevens, writing 
for the majority, also reasoned that the restraint of trade did not promote a 
pro-competitive effect.163 
Therefore, the NCAA in this hypothetical challenge must demonstrate 
that the pro-competitive virtues of the conduct or practices either (1) make 
the availability of the product possible or efficient, or (2) act to counter 
some great evil the defendant seeks to protect against, such as nonmonetary 
values.164 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show that 
the defendant’s conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve those pro-
competitive virtues.165 Here, the NCAA would likely allege that its 
scholarships only cover the fundamental financial requirements of a college 
education, a valid justification because it seeks to protect its core value of 
keeping college sports amateur,166 which requires not allowing college 
athletes to benefit unfairly in a financial manner from playing collegiate 
sports. The NCAA would likely allege that allowing scholarships to provide 
student-athletes with financial aid beyond that which is fundamentally 
necessary to their educations would constitute payments for services and 
thus contravene the amateur nature of college sports. The importance of this 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02. 
 159. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
 160. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103. 
 161. Id. at 120. 
 162. Id. at 103 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id. at 113–20. 
 164. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1, at 1 (stating that a basic purpose of the 
NCAA is to “retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and 
professional sports”). 
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value has been evidenced repeatedly in the past by the NCAA,167 which 
takes very seriously any violation of the rule prohibiting receipt of payment 
while a player is still an NCAA athlete.168 
2. Bylaw 15.1 Has a Substantially Adverse Effect on Competition 
Under the rule of reason test, a plaintiff shows that the restraint is 
unreasonable by demonstrating that the challenged restraint has a 
substantially adverse effect on competition.169 A plaintiff may show 
anticompetitive effects either through thorough market analysis or, when 
the restraint is direct and readily measurable, a quick look analysis.170 
The potential plaintiff class’s argument showing that Bylaw 15.1 has a 
substantially adverse effect on competition would be that Bylaw 15.1 is a 
horizontal restraint amounting to an illegal price cap. The horizontal 
restraint here is that the NCAA’s limit on the amount of scholarship money 
that may be offered to a student-athlete is fixed at the value of a full grant-
in-aid, which is approximately $3000 less than the estimated cost of 
attending the university. Alternatively, it could be arbitrarily capped at 
$2000 above the full grant-in-aid if the NCAA adopts the stipend. 
Either way, this discrepancy in funds creates a horizontal restraint effect 
between the member institutions and student-athletes because the member 
institutions are unable to offer comprehensive scholarship packages that 
cover all costs of the athletes’ educations and the student-athletes are forced 
to accept scholarships insufficient to cover the costs of their educations. 
Thus, Bylaw 15.1 binds the institution from competing for the best athletes 
by offering the best scholarship packages; and, as a consequence, student-
athletes are subject to $3000 gaps in funds. 
Fixed prices without regard to differing quality amount to a “classic 
cartel.”171 Through Bylaw 15.1, the NCAA imposes a limit on scholarship 
funds without regard to the fact that the estimated cost of attending member 
institutions is, on average, approximately $3000 more than the limit under 
Bylaw 15.1. This conduct amounts to NCAA “cartel control” under Board 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See, e.g., Mark Schlabach, NCAA Sends Message to Ohio State, ESPN (Dec. 20, 
2011), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7373708/ncaa-sends-message-sanction 
s-ohio-state-buckeyes (describing NCAA sanctions imposed on the Ohio State University 
after players sold autographs and memorabilia). 
 168. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2(b), at 60 (removing amateur status if the 
athlete “[a]ccepts a promise of pay”). 
 169. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016, 1019. 
 170. Id. at 1019-20. 
 171. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 96 (1984) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. 
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300-01 (W.D. Okla. 1982)). 
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of Regents, when “[t]he cartel has established a uniform price for the 
products of each of the member producers, with no regard for the differing 
quality . . . for these various products.”172 With Bylaw 15.1, the NCAA 
imposed a fixed amount of money available to student-athletes without any 
regard for the fluctuating costs of attendance at various schools and without 
regard for the hardship this gap in funds would impose on the student-
athlete. 
Furthermore, the NCAA imposes a punishment173 for any athletes who 
receive funds in excess of the deficiently-set scholarship limits, so the 
student-athletes have practically no way to alleviate the financial burdens 
imposed on them due to the differences in the grant-in-aid amounts and the 
estimated cost of attendance amounts. Combining all of these factors—that 
is, horizontal price fixing and fixing price without regard to differing 
quality of the product—the NCAA’s level of control by its implementation 
of Bylaw 15.1 should be per se illegal because it is a direct restraint of trade 
and, arguably, entirely void of redeeming competitive rationales.174 
A plaintiff class would first examine whether the challenged rule has a 
direct effect on competition, like price fixing or output caps, and determine 
if the anticompetitive effect is readily measurable.175 Under Albrecht v. 
Herald, price ceilings may constitute unreasonable restraints of trade 
because they reduce the ability of market participants to engage in supply-
and-demand based pricing.176 However, the Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Brown University recognized that for schools sharing scholarship 
information, the pro-competitive virtues were sufficient to warrant 
balancing with the anticompetitive effects and thus applied the full rule of 
reason test.177 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1300-01) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 173. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2(b), at 60 (removing amateur status if the 
athlete “[a]ccepts a promise of pay”). 
 174. Compare this hypothetical law suit with Law. 134 F.3d 1010. In Law, the alleged 
restraint of trade was a limit on coaches’ pay. Id. at 1012. The court analyzed this restraint 
under a rule of reason analysis and held that the compensation limit was an unlawful 
restraint of trade. Id. at 1024. The analogous argument is that student-athletes receive 
compensation in the form of athletic scholarships. And if the NCAA limits this 
compensation, then it has unlawfully restrained trade. 
 175. See id. at 1019. 
 176. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)), overruled by State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997). 
 177. 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Although the court in Law acknowledged that horizontal price fixing was 
usually illegal per se, it also recognized the NCAA, and amateur sports as a 
whole, as a unique market that may require horizontal restraints such as 
Bylaw 15.1 in order for the market to exist at all.178 Similarly, because 
some horizontal agreements are necessary to even create the product of 
amateur athletics, a court would likely perform a full rule of reason analysis 
to make sure all factors were considered when determining if the restraint 
was unreasonable.179 
The plaintiff-student-athletes would show that Bylaw 15.1 places a direct 
cap on the scholarship monies that institutions may provide to student-
athletes. The effect of this direct restraint requires student-athletes to cover 
the additional costs represented by the gap between the full grant-in-aid and 
the institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance. Because the student-
athletes are not allowed to benefit from NCAA member institutions 
competing with one another for their athletic abilities,180 Bylaw 15.1 has 
imposed a lower standard of living and significant hardships on many 
student-athletes. Student-athletes already have very full schedules and do 
not have a lot of time to work part-time jobs to cover additional costs.181 
To prove that the defendant’s conduct has a substantially adverse effect 
on competition, a plaintiff may establish the effect of the defendant’s 
conduct indirectly by showing the defendant “possessed the requisite 
market power within a defined market or directly by showing actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as control over output or price.”182 The NCAA 
would argue that the plaintiffs could not prove whether the NCAA has 
power in the market for scholarships offered to student-athletes because the 
member institutions are the ones who choose which athletes to offer 
scholarships to and in what amounts. However, this argument will likely 
fail under Board of Regents because “the absence of proof of market power 
does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, 
when there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1017. 
 179. Id. at 1021. 
 180. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2(b), at 60 (removing amateur status if the 
athlete “[a]ccepts a promise of pay”). 
 181. See Sobocinski, supra note 98, at 262 (“[T]he student-athlete is faced with the 
demands of two full-time jobs: full-time student and big-time athlete . . . .”). 
 182. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
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elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive 
character of such an agreement.’”183 
In Law, the court explained: 
[A]nticompetitive effect is established, even without a 
determination of the relevant market, where the plaintiff shows 
that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that the 
agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an 
agreement is more favorable to the defendant than otherwise 
would have resulted from the operation of market forces.184 
In our hypothetical case, the NCAA will likely argue that it adopted Bylaw 
15.1 to reduce the high cost of funding expensive revenue-producing sports 
like basketball and football. As a matter of common sense, the NCAA is not 
likely to argue that the cap on scholarship funds has no effect on reducing 
the amount needed to fund football and basketball programs at Division I 
member institutions. Thus, because Bylaw 15.1 is successful in artificially 
lowering the price of scholarships offered to athletes to a deficient amount, 
a court is most likely to skip the relevant market analysis and move straight 
to the question of whether the pro-competitive justifications advanced for 
the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 
Further, absent this gap, the plaintiffs may also show that the NCAA 
member institutions and student-athletes would be able to compete even 
more. Because the NCAA controls every member institution, and all 
Division I programs belong to the NCAA,185 this produces an 
anticompetitive effect. If a member institution does not belong to the 
NCAA then it may miss out on valuable opportunities for endorsement 
contracts, championship or tournament events, and funding for its 
programs. The NCAA may rebut this argument, however, because it can 
claim to be a voluntary organization made up of member institutions that 
voluntarily agree to bylaws resulting in these effects on financial aid.186 
  
                                                                                                                 
 183. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
 184. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
 185. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 20.9, at 340. 
 186. See id., § 3.1, at 8. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/2
2013] THE MYTH OF THE “FULL RIDE” 637 
 
 
3. Because of the Direct and Readily Measurable Anticompetitive Effect 
of Bylaw 15.1, the NCAA Must Show Pro-competitive Virtues of Such a 
Restriction 
Once the plaintiffs have shown the anticompetitive effect of Bylaw 15.1, 
the NCAA must justify its restraint as “reasonable” by proffering sufficient 
pro-competitive virtues for the anticompetitive restriction.187 This is where 
the plaintiffs have their strongest argument because it will be very difficult 
for the NCAA to show how it is reasonable to limit the amount of 
scholarship money a college may offer a student-athlete to a value less than 
the institutionally set, estimated cost of attending school. This is the real 
issue underlying the entire (hypothetical) lawsuit. 
The NCAA will most likely argue that it is in the unique market of 
amateur sports and that its role is to foster the best environment for amateur 
sports to flourish and continue.188 It will also argue that it has a legitimate 
and noncommercial goal of maintaining the line of distinction between 
amateur and professional sports,189 and that Bylaw 15.1 is simply one rule 
in a grand scheme that has the goal of self-regulation, not commercial 
profit. 
The NCAA may be able to show that Bylaw 15.1 fosters competition in 
an open market, especially among member institutions that have large 
football and basketball programs. Bylaw 15.1 levels the playing field 
between wealthier and less wealthy institutions because it prevents 
wealthier institutions from offering “extra” monies to prospective student-
athletes. However, the plaintiffs can refute this claim by questioning why 
the difference between the full grant-in-aid and the estimated cost of 
attendance is “extra” when a school’s central financial aid office deems 
these estimated expenses necessary costs for attending the specific school. 
Additionally, the NCAA will most likely advance several justifications 
for scholarship limits. The first likely justification advanced is that Bylaw 
15.1 preserves a competitive balance among the member institutions 
because, without it, competition between the schools for the best athletes 
would lead to unlimited scholarship amounts offered to students, and those 
schools with less money would not be able to compete.190 Yet, the plaintiff 
class could rebut this argument because, as was the case in Law, the court 
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will have to question whether “cost reductions can serve as a legally 
sufficient justification . . . even if such cost reductions are necessary to save 
inefficient or unsuccessful competitors from failure.”191 Furthermore, 
“[r]educing costs for member institutions, without more, does not justify the 
anticompetitive effects of the . . . [r]ule.”192 Likewise, “mere profitability or 
cost savings [do] not qualif[y] as a defense under the antitrust laws”193 
because this argument “[i]mproperly assumes that antitrust law should not 
apply to condemn the creation of market power in an input market.”194 
Indeed, “[i]f holding down costs by the exercise of market power over 
suppliers, rather than just by increased efficiency, is a pro-competitive 
effect justifying joint conduct, then section 1 can never apply to input 
markets or buyer cartels.”195 The main inquiry a court will consider is 
whether this objectively serves as a legitimate pro-competitive end, and the 
NCAA must present evidence that limits on scholarships offered to student-
athletes are both successful in reducing costs and deficits and necessary to 
save the commodity: amateur college athletics. 
The second likely attempted justification is that without Bylaw 15.1, 
wealthier schools will manipulate their university-set cost of living 
estimates to values higher than are real for the purpose of being more 
competitive and enticing blue-chip recruits to sign with their schools 
because they can offer more money. However, this concern is unfounded. 
The institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance is the ceiling for 
financial aid for every student who matriculates at a school and those 
numbers must comply with Department of Education parameters because 
they also serve as the upper limits for students receiving federal student 
loans.196 
Finally, the NCAA is likely to argue that Bylaw 15.1 is necessary for 
maintaining competitiveness. In Law, the court recognized that a “team 
must try to establish itself as a winner, but it must not win so often and so 
convincingly that the outcome will never be in doubt, or else there will be 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Law, 134 F.3d at 1023. 
 192. Id. 
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no marketable competition.”197 The NCAA will likely assert that Bylaw 
15.1 helps to maintain competitive equity by preventing wealthier schools 
from offering higher scholarships to the most talented athletes. However, 
the rule is “nothing more than a cost-cutting measure.”198 It would appear 
that “the only consideration the NCAA gave to competitive balance was 
simply to structure the rule so as not to exacerbate competitive 
imbalance.”199 This interest alone is not a valid antitrust defense. If the caps 
were lifted, then member institutions could compete amongst each other for 
the best talent for their athletic programs, and lesser-known schools might 
be able to attract prospective talent away from the more-widely known 
programs to create better parity in collegiate athletics. Therefore, the 
arbitrary cap only serves to lessen the competition amongst member 
institutions. 
4. The Anticompetitive Effect of Bylaw 15.1 Outweighs the Pro-
competitive Rationales for the Price Cap 
Should the NCAA offer legitimate pro-competitive rationales for Bylaw 
15.1 which create pro-competitive virtues based on its enforcement, then 
the plaintiffs must prove it is still not reasonable, even considering those 
virtues.200 The plaintiffs would be able to show that Bylaw 15.1, even with 
the $2000 stipend above the full grant-in-aid amount, is not reasonably 
necessary to obtain the objectives that the defendant put forward. 
Conversely, the plaintiffs could argue that the NCAA’s “objectives [could] 
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”201 First, the plaintiff-
student-athletes could show that it is unreasonable for the NCAA to enforce 
an arbitrary cap to save costs and to increase revenues202 because even if 
those revenues generated are fed back to the member institutions, 
purportedly for the student athletes’ welfare, this arbitrary method of 
benefitting the institutions has an overly broad impact. 
Second, the plaintiffs could show that there are less restrictive means to 
obtain the objectives than the defendant has put forward.203 If the NCAA 
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seeks to protect the sheen of amateurism, there are other considerations in 
preserving amateurism that could be implemented instead of having a cap 
of a grant-in-aid. For example, a plaintiff class could contend that a less 
restrictive means might include assigning each student-athlete a financial 
counselor to evaluate his or her individual financial needs. This would 
enable the NCAA member institution to subjectively determine the actual 
cost of attending college for each student-athlete and allow its scholarship 
to include only those costs. Of course, the NCAA would rebut this 
argument by asserting that this task would be too tedious, costly, and 
inefficient, and thus capping the scholarships at a rate which covers only 
the fundamental needs of the student-athletes is more efficient and less 
vulnerable to manipulation.204 
So, instead, the less restrictive alternative offered here would be that the 
objective, institutionally set, estimated cost of attendance, which still limits 
athletically-related scholarship monies, but only to the amount that the 
school deems necessary for the student to attend that college in that locale, 
better serves the NCAA’s objective of protecting amateurism. 
Overall, amateurism can be preserved by other means than the current 
Bylaw 15.1 so long as student-athletes are not being paid to play in their 
respective sports amounts above what is necessary for degree completion. 
But, when student-athletes are at severe disadvantages and are not allowed 
to receive enough money to survive in their respective college programs, 
the restriction is not reasonable. 
VII. Potential Issues that May Arise Due to the Liberalization of the 
NCAA’s Bylaws 
We acknowledge some concerns if NCAA Bylaw 15.1 is liberalized. 
Institutions can argue that raising the scholarship limit to the cost of 
attendance will be very expensive for some colleges,205 particularly those 
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with higher costs of living. The backlash of such liberalization could be 
destructive. Although there would be no requirement to offer the full 
amount, no college would want to put itself at a competitive disadvantage 
by not fully funding its football program. Such a rule change at some 
Division I schools will make football, for example, much more expensive to 
field.206 And, in the short term we can presume, unfortunately, that this 
money will be stripped from the non-revenue-producing programs and 
perhaps will take away some opportunities from other student-athletes.207 
Division I institutions and the NCAA make large amounts of money on 
the likenesses and images of their players—whether it be in apparel or 
video games.208 Student-athletes ought to be entitled to at least be able to 
finance their educations if these parties are going to make such large 
profits.209 
What is the real concern here? We are not persuaded by the argument 
that the big money schools will manipulate their university-set cost of 
living estimates to values higher than reality for the purpose of being more 
competitive and enticing blue-chip recruits to sign with their schools 
                                                                                                                 
attendance and full grant-in-aid could amount to a massive new expenditure of about $100 
million for Division I schools. Id. 
 206. As one example, if the average increase required to close the gap is $2500, a new 
cost of $212,500 will be added to a Division I football program alone ($2500 x 85 = 
$212,500). Currently, NCAA member institutions are prohibited from offering more than 85 
full-ride football scholarships per year. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.6, at 215. 
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(discussing the similarities of Division I athletes in video games and NCAA revenue 
resulting from those video games). 
 209. See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses—2008, ESPN, espn.go.com/ncaa/ 
revenue (last visited May 27, 2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
642 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:605 
 
 
because they can offer more money. We should not continue to prematurely 
punish student-athletes for the potential wrongdoings of schools. 
But, despite that small risk, the NCAA should still allow those noble 
schools with financial ability the opportunity to choose to do the right thing 
because it is for the student-athletes’ beneficial welfare, whether only one 
institution offers to fill the gap or 300 institutions offer to do so.210 
Conclusion 
If the NCAA truly wishes to enhance the potential benefits available for 
student-athletes by emphasizing education and degree completion, it should 
start by allowing institutions to fully pay for student-athletes’ educations.211 
The NCAA should eliminate the scholarship gap by liberalizing Bylaw 15.1 
to allow for individual scholarship limits up to the estimated costs of 
attendance. 
The alternative to liberalizing Bylaw 15.1 is to turn the White settlement 
into a permanent fixture, whereby the NCAA sets up a fund to address 
future claims by all student-athletes to assist in covering the expenses 
represented by the gap. As a general framework, the NCAA would have to 
establish the new fund, which would mirror the terms of the White 
settlement, and allow member institutions to use a set pool of money to 
address the permissible and additional education needs of students; and this 
pool should be replenished when depleted so as to accommodate claims by 
future student-athletes. Of course, there are many issues that must be 
addressed if the NCAA implements the new fund. How much should the 
base amount of the fund be? And how many claims will there be per year? 
And who should handle the processing of these claims—the NCAA, the 
athletic conference, or the institution? The innumerate number of issues 
further demonstrates that an amendment to Bylaw 15.1 is most appropriate. 
There is no easy answer to this serious dilemma and, in the end, it is the 
student-athletes disadvantaged because of this restriction; they alone must 
shoulder the on-average $3000 per year burdens placed on them by the gap 
between the value of the grant-in-aid and the institutionally set, estimated 
cost of attendance. In sum, we are certain that the White settlement and the 
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stipend amendment signify that the NCAA is willing to throw money at the 
situation. 
Thus, though it might be possible to come to a compromise by 
establishing the new fund mirroring the terms of the White settlement so 
that future claims by student-athletes could be addressed and alleviated 
without the need to go through an entire class action lawsuit (or equally 
harrowing battle), the best solution is an alteration to Bylaw 15.1. 
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